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Abstract—The targeted advertising is based on preference profiles inferred via relationships among individuals, their monitored
responses to previous advertising and temporal activity over the Internet, which has raised critical privacy concerns. In this paper,
we present a novel proposal for a Blockchain-based advertising platform that provides: a system for privacy preserving user profiling,
privately requesting ads from the advertising system, the billing mechanisms for presented and clicked ads, the advertising system that
uploads ads to the cloud according to profiling interests, various types of transactions to enable advertising operations in Blockchain-
based network, and the method that allows a cloud system to privately compute the access policies for various resources (such as
ads, mobile user profiles). Our main goal is to design a decentralized framework for targeted ads, which enables private delivery of
ads to users whose behavioral profiles accurately match the presented ads, defined by the ad system. We implement a POC of our
proposed framework i.e. a Bespoke Miner and experimentally evaluate various components of Blockchain-based in-app advertising
system, implementing various critical components; such as, evaluating user profiles, implementing access policies, encryption and
decryption of users’ profiles. We observe that the processing delay for traversing policies of various tree sizes, the encryption/decryption
time of user profiling with various key-sizes and user profiles of various interests evaluates to an acceptable amount of processing time
as that of the currently implemented ad systems.
Index Terms—Privacy, Advertising, Blockchain, Mobile Advertising System, Access Policy, Cryptocurrency
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile advertising ecosystem is one of the most successful
markets, in recent years, with billions of mobile devices,
including smartphones, tablets, and computer tablets, and
millions of mobile applications (apps) registered in vari-
ous app platforms, such as Google Play Store, Apps Store
etc. The advertising companies enable user tracking within
apps, and hence profiling users, where user’s personal infor-
mation plays an important role in ads targeting. However,
significant privacy concerns are associated with it, as sug-
gested in a number of studies [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. Other
studies [7], [8] indicate, unless consumers have specifically
consented to it, that they have a direct relationship between
consumer attitude and their behavior, i.e. consumers’ trust
in privacy of mobile advertising is positively related to their
willingness to accept mobile advertising. The American ad
industry, implemented self-regulated by implementing Ad-
Choices1 program, which states that consumer could opt-out
of targeted advertising via online choices to control ads from
other networks. However, another study [9] examines that
opt-out users cause 52% less revenue (hence presents less
relevant ads and lower click through rates) than those users
who allow targeted advertising. In addition, the authors
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1. Founded in 2010. https://optout.aboutads.info/?c=2&lang=EN
noted that these ad impressions were only requested by
0.23% of American consumers.
Hence, the purpose of targeted advertising is to deliver
most relevant ads to achieve better view/click through
rates and without exposing users’ private information to
the advertising companies and third party publishers/ad
networks. Prior research works show the extent to which
consumers are effectively tracked by a number of third
parties and across multiple apps [10], mobile devices leak-
ing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) [11], [12], apps
accessing user’s private/sensitive information through well
defined APIs [13], inference attacks based on monitoring ads
[6] and other data platform such as eXelate2, BlueKai3, and
AddThis4 that collect, enrich and resell cookies.
There are other works on protecting user’s privacy by
obfuscating user profiles5 [5], [15] and based on security
techniques [2], enabling user privacy [16], [17] by sug-
gesting design changes to Android location API based on
laboratory study [18] to understand developer’s behavior.
Other privacy preserving advertising systems use a mix of
cryptography techniques and obfuscation mechanisms, e.g.,
[19], [20] and targeted mobile coupon delivery scheme using
Blockchain [21]. We note that the majority of the private
advertising systems have been proposed for browser based
ads [22], [23], [24], [25] whereas only few works address the
in-app targeted ads [2], [15], [21], [26]. Our focus in this work
is to protect individual’s privacy by decoupling all direct
2. https://microsites.nielsen.com/daas-partners/partner/exelate/
3. https://www.oracle.com/corporate/acquisitions/bluekai/
4. https://www.addthis.com/
5. A large scale investigation of obfuscation use where authors ana-
lyze 1.7 million free Android apps from Google Play to detect various
obfuscation techniques is presented in [14].
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2communications between apps, analytics companies, which
they use for targeted advertisements, advertising systems
(including third party) for their activities (both for web and
apps activity) using Blockchain technology.
Blockchain is based on a distributed ledger of transac-
tions, shared across the participating entities, and provides
auditable transitions [27], where the transactions are verified
by participating entities within operating network. Among
the participating entities; the Miner is a special node respon-
sible for generating transactions, adding them to the pool
of pending transactions and organizing into a block once the
size of transactions reaches a specific block size. The process
of adding a new block to the Blockchain is referred to as
mining and follows a consensus algorithm, such as Proof
of Work (POW) [28] and Proof of Stake (POS) [29], which
ensures the security of Blockchain against malicious (Miner)
users. The participating entities use the Public-Private Key
pair that is used to achieve the anonymity [30]. Among
various salient features of Blockchain, i.e. irreversible, au-
ditable, updated near real-time, chronological and times-
tamp, which, in addition, disregards the need of a central
controlling authority; thus making it a perfect choice for
restricting communication between the mobile apps and the
analytics/ad companies and keeping individual’s privacy.
Our main contributions in this paper include the fol-
lowing. We investigate the relation between the mobile
apps usage and the resulting user profiles derived by a
major analytics network i.e., Google AdMob. We mainly
describe three states of the user profiles i.e. the user profiles
that are established during when no interests are derived
by the analytics services i.e. profile establishment process,
the state of the profiles once apps are used that would
originate interests other than the existing set of apps i.e.
profile evolution process, and stable states of the profiles where
subsequent use of existing set of apps have no effect over the
profiles. We also determine the broad profiling rules during
various processes of utilising android apps: that profiles
represent an aggregation of interests generated by use of
individual apps, that there is a fixed mapping of apps to
sets of interests and that a minimum level of activity (in
a period of up to 72h) is required to build a stable user
profile. We correspondingly develop an analytical model
for depicting various profiling states and rules to represent
profiling processes.
Following, we design a framework for secure user pro-
filing and Blockchain-based targeted advertising system for
in-app mobile ads and the design of various critical compo-
nents of advertising system, as follows: the 1. Ads Placement
Server (APS) for evaluating ads according to various profile
interests, hashing ads and sending hashed profiles along
with corresponding ads to CS 2. Cloud System (CS) for
storing hashed profiles along with corresponding ads sent
by APS, in addition, maintaining a copy of user profiles 3.
Cluster Head (CH) for processing ad-block requests, access
control policy for various operations, such as storing user
profile etc., and fetching ads from CS according to user
profiles 4. System App (Miner) that sits on user’s mobile
device and calculates user’s profiles, sends hashed user
profile to CH, uploads user profiles on CS, and requests
and delivers ads to mobile app 5. Billing Server (BS) for
calculating billing for presented and clicked ads with the use
of Cryptocurrency for ensuring privacy, secure payment and
for compatibility with the underlying proposed advertising
system over Blockchain 6. Access Control Policy implemented
in Miner for holding an access control list that allows apps
regarding evaluation of different operations e.g. to check
whether an app is allowed to request for ads, participate in
billing etc., and on CS to control access of ad-request coming
from various Miners. The access policy is implemented as a
policy tree that consists of matching functions for allowing
access to various operations or resources and their corre-
sponding actions.
We design the structure for various trans-
actions for an ad-request/response block for oper-
ating within the Blockchain network e.g. block
structure of an Ad-Block-Header-Request,
Ad-Block-Header-Response, and
Ad-Block-Structure. We design various algorithms that
specify comprehensive operations of various components
of the advertising system. Furthermore, we discuss
various design requirements in terms of privacy, reduced
overhead over (user) client, compatibility of billing with
Cryptocurrency, and achieving system efficiency and
component’s compatibility within the Blockchain network.
We develop an Android-based Proof of Concept (POC)
implementation i.e. a Bespoke Miner for evaluating various
components of Blockchain-based in-app advertising system,
such as, generating public-private key pair, evaluating user
profiles, encrypting user profile or decrypting the ads re-
ceived from CS, implementing access policy, and its interac-
tion with the CS. We design a detailed experimental setup
that consists of Bespoke Miner and CS (a local machine
for correspondence with the Bespoke Miner), following, we
utilise real parameter settings obtained by extensive our
real-time experiments [15], [31] (and further verified that
these parameters still hold) that include various sizes of
an ad, set of interests with a user profile etc. We calculate
the processing delay for generating public-private key pair,
encryption/decryption time of user profiling with various
key-sizes and user profiles, and processing delay for travers-
ing policies of various sizes. We observe that, using various
512, 1024, 2048, 4096 bits sizes of public-private key pairs, the
Min processing time ranges from 0.005sec to 0.30sec.
Following, we calculate encryption and decryption time
for user profiles with interests, randomly chosen up to 20
interests with an Avg and St.Dev of respectively 10.53
and 5.88 interests, using 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192 bits sizes of
public-private key pairs and evaluate the processing delays of
Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev. We observe that, for instance, the
Min and Max profile encryption times with (1024, 8192)
bits key sizes are respectively (0.1msec, 1.2msec) and
(2.2msec, 16.3msec), with an Avg and St.Dev of (0.4msec)
each and (6.0msec, 3.2msec). In addition, the decryption
time evaluates to (0.001sec, 0.005mse) and (0.35sec, 1.67sec)
with Avg and St.Dev of (0.002sec, 0.0009sec) and (0.8sec,
and 0.36sec). Based on our observations [2], [5], we note that
this is an (equivalent) acceptable amount of processing time
to that of when a mobile app requests ad in the beginning
of an app launch or during the app usage session.
Rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2
presents detailed discussion over the profiling process
and formulates the problem. Section 3 presents various
3components of the proposed framework for secure user
profiling and Blockchain-based targeted advertising sys-
tem for in-app mobile ads. In Section 4, we present the
Ad-Block-Structure for an ad-request/response for oper-
ating within the Blockchain network. Details of Ad-Block
operations is presented in 5, followed by experimental
setup, including details of POC implementation for bespoke
Miner, and experimental evaluation in Section 6. Related
work is summarised in Section 7 and conclusion of our work
is given in Section 8.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formalise the system model that consists of the appli-
cations’ profiles, interests’ profiles and the conversion of
resulting profiles by use of applications in an app profile.
In particular, we provide the insights of establishment of
Interests profiles by individual apps in the Apps profiles and
then show how the profiles evolve when some apps other
than the initial set of apps are utilised.
2.1 Profiling
An app marketplace includes a set of A mobile apps, that
are commonly (e.g., in Google Play or in the Apple App
store) organised within different categories. We denote an
app by ai,j , i = 1, ..., Aj , where Aj is the number of apps
that belong to an app category Φj , j = 1, ..., τ and τ is the
number of different categories in the marketplace.
A user may be characterised by a combination of apps
installed on their mobile device(s), comprising a subset Sa of
the apps set A. An Apps profile Ka can therefore be defined
as:
Ka = {{ai,j ,Φj} : ai,j ∈ Sa} (1)
Analytics companies (e.g., Google or Flurry) profile users
by defining a set of profile interests G, i.e., characteristics
that may be assigned to users. Interests are commonly
grouped into categories, with interests gk,l, k = 1, ..., Gl,
whereGl is the number of interests that belong to an interest
category Ψl, l = 1, ..., .  is the number of interest categories
defined by the analytics company. Table 1 shows notations
used in this work.
Profiling characterises the user by the combination of
their interests, i.e., by a subset Sg of the full interest set G.
Google profile interests6 are grouped, hierarchically, under
vaiours interests categories, with specific interests. An Inter-
ests profile Ig for a user can therefore be defined as:
Ig = {{gk,l,Ψl} : gk,l ∈ Sg} (2)
We note that although various types of information may
be used to generate user profiles, here we focus on the
interests derived from the usage of installed apps. Note
that we will use the Apps profile Ka and Interests profile Ig
respectively for calculating the Contextual and Targeted ads.
In addition, ads targeting is based on demographics so as
to reach a specific set of potential customers that are likely to
6. Google profile interests are listed in https://adssettings.google.
com/authenticated?hl=en, displayed under the ’How your ads are
personalized’, other options and Google services can also be verified on
Google Dashboard https://myaccount.google.com/dashboard?hl=en.
be within a specific age range, gender etc., Google7 presents
a detailed set of various demographic targeting options for
ads display, search campaigns etc. Hence, profiling also
characterises users by various demographics under different
options. The demographics D are usually grouped into
different categories, with specific options dm,n,m = 1, ...,M
and n = 1, ..., N , where M is the targeted demographics
ranges, e.g. ‘18-24’, ‘25-34’, ‘35-44’, ‘45-54’, ‘55-64’, ‘65 or
more’, and ‘Male’, ‘Female’, ‘Rather not say’, and N is
the number of different demographic targeting options e.g.
household income, parental status, location etc. Note that
for simplicity, we do not consider the user history and leave
it for future work. We suggest that the profiling is done on
the user side (i.e. done by the System App8, see Figure 2).
Following sub-section details derivation of Interests pro-
file, which we call the profile Establishment process.
2.2 Mapping Rules for Profiling
We now deliberate the profiling rules as a result of utilisa-
tion of mobile apps. The advertising networks derive Interest
profiles for wide range of audiences based on the collected
information and accordingly target the mobile users. Note
that the mapping rules outlined in this section are based on
our observations [5] [31] [6].
2.2.0.1 Profile Establishment: User profile is estab-
lished by using the installed apps for certain amount of time,
after it has sufficient interactions with analytics services. We
assume that there is a mapping of Apps profile to an Interests
profile defined by Google Analytics, which is used by ana-
lytics companies to individually characterise user’s interests
across the advertising ecosystem. A sample mapping is also
given in [5] where we observed mapping of Apps profile to
Interests profile by a series of various profiling experiments.
This mapping includes the conversion of apps categories
Φj to interest categories Ψl. This mapping converts an app
ai,j ∈ Sa to interest set Si,jg after a specific level of activity
test. The test is the establishment threshold i.e. time an app
should be used in order to establish profile’s interests. The
set Si,jg derived by an app ai,j can be represented as a set of
interests gk,l along with their corresponding categories Ψl:
Si,jg ⊂ {{gk,l,Ψl} : gk,l ∈ G} (3)
We note that all installed apps, from a specific mobile
device, do not necessarily contribute to the profile9, in which
case the Si,jg is an empty set.
Finally, the resulting Interests profile Ig is established as
the combination of individual interests derived by each app.
The Interests profile can be expressed as the union of all the
interests sets Si,jg derived by individual app ai,j in Sa; hence
Eq. 2 can be re-written as follows:
Ig =
⋃
∀(i,j) : ai,j∈Sa
Si,jg (4)
7. Demographic Targeting https://support.google.com/google-ads/
answer/2580383?hl=en
8. The System App is similar to the AdMob SDK [5] that communicates
with Google Analytics for deriving user profiles.
9. The full list of installed apps on an Android based phone
is included in the library.db file /data/data/com.android.vending/
databases/library.db
4Symbols Description
A Set of apps in a marketplace
τ Number of app categories, Φj is a selected category, j = 1, ..., τ
Sa Subset of apps installed on a user’s mobile device
ai,j An app ai,j ∈ A, i = 1, ..., Aj , j = 1, ..., τ , Aj is the number of apps in Φj
Ka App profile consisting of apps ai,j and their categories Φj
G Set of interests in Google interests list
Ψl
Interest category in G, l = 1, ..., ,  is the number of interest
categories defined by Google
Sg Subset of Google interests in G derived by Sa
Ig Interest profile consisting of gk,l, gk,l ∈ Sg
gk,l An interest in Ig , k ∈ Gl, l ∈ 
Si,jg Set of interests derived by an app ai,j
D The set of demographics defined by analytics companies
dm,n Demographics options dm,n ∈ D, m = 1, ...,M and n = 1, ..., N
Sd Subset of user’s demographics derived by System App
TABLE 1: List of Notations.
Furthermore, System App derives users’ demographics
Sd from their settings (e.g. Gmail settings) or by inferring
their demographics based on their activities. We suggest that
the users may ‘edit’ their demographics within the System
App, i.e. similar to that by visiting Google Ad Settings10.
Ig =
⋃
∀(i,j):ai,j∈Sa
si,jg ∪
⋃
∀(m,n):m,n∈Sd
dm,n (5)
2.2.0.2 Profile Evolution: The profile is updated,
and hence the ads targeting, each time variations in the users’
behaviour are observed; such as for a mobile user using
apps that would map to interests other than the existing set
of interests. Let a user uses new set of apps S′a, which has
no overlap with the existing set of apps Sa that has created
Ig i.e., S′a ⊂ A \ Sa.
The newly added set of apps S′a is converted to in-
terests gk,l with tevo as evolution threshold i.e. the time
required to evolve profile’s interests. Thus, an app a′i,j in
S′a should be used for tevo time in order to evolve profile’s
interests S
′i,j
g . The sets of interests S
′i,j
g derived by a
′
i,j
are represented as the union of all interests I ′g , i.e. I
′
g =⋃
∀(i,j) : ai,j∈S′a
S
′i,j
g along with the updated demographics (if
any)
⋃
∀(m,n):m,n∈Sd
d′m,n. Hence, the final Interests profile, I
f
g ,
after the profile Evolution process, is the combination of
older interests derived during the profile Establishment Ig
and during when the profile evolves I ′g and is given as:
Ifg = Ig ∪ I ′g (6)
2.2.0.3 Profile Development Process: We now elab-
orate insights of profile Establishment and Evolution pro-
cesses performed by Google analytics and adopt the same
strategy of profile Development process. In order for the Apps
profile to establish an Interests profile, a minimum level of
activity of the installed apps is required. Furthermore, in
order to generate one or more interests, an app needs to
have the AdMob SDK. This was verified by testing a total
of 1200 apps selected from a subset of 12 categories, for a
duration of 8 days, among which 1143 apps resulted the
Interest profiles on all test phones indicating “Unknown”
10. Google Ad personalisation https://adssettings.google.com/
authenticated
interests. We also note that the Apps profile deterministically
derives an Interests profile i.e., a specific app constantly
derives identical set of interests after certain level of activity.
We further note that the level of activity of installed apps
be within a minimum of 24h period (using our extensive
experimentations; we note that this much time is required
by Google Analytics in order to determine ones’ interests),
with a minimum of, from our experimentations, 24/n hours
of activity of n apps. For a sophisticated profiling, a user
might want to install and use a good number of apps that
would represent one’s interests. After the 24h period, the
profile becomes Stable and further activity of the same apps
does not result in any further changes.
Similarly, during the profile Evolution process, the Inter-
ests profile starts changing by adding new interests; once
apps other than the existing set of apps Sa are utilised.
However, instead of 24h of period of evolving a profile,
we observe that the Evolution process adds additional in-
terests in the following 72 hours of period, after which
the aggregated profile i.e. Ifg becomes Stable. In order to
verify the stability of the aggregated profile, we run these
apps on 4th day; henceforth we observe no further changes.
The mapping of Apps profile to Interests profile during the
Establishment and during the Evolution process along with
their corresponding Stable states are shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Profile Establishment & Evolution processes. I∅ is the
empty profile before apps utilisation. During Stable states,
Interest profiles Ig or Ifg remains the same and further activi-
ties of the same apps have no effect over the profiles.
2.3 Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this paper is where advertising
systems profile and track mobile users for their activities
and to tailor ads to their specific interests. In complex mobile
environment, as opposed to browser-based ads targeting
where users are tracked and profiled against their visited
5websites and ad clicks, the users’ interests are based on
various norms: selection of mobile apps installed and used,
(traditional) browser based profiling, ad clicks of certain
categories of ads, demographics e.g. age-rank, location etc.;
to create a unified user profile. User profiling and its related
ads targeting expose sensitive information about users [5],
[15], e.g. the target could browse through gambling websites
or spends excessive time using gambling apps, revealing
(including a third-party, such as the website owner) to the
advertising systems that the user is a heavy gambler.
In particular, we address two privacy attacks: Legitimate
user profiling by Analytics, in traditional advertising sys-
tems, these functionalities are implemented via an analytics
SDK [32] for reporting user’s activities to Analytics & Ads
networks, hence, observe various requests to/from mobile
users. Indirect privacy attack, involves third parties that could
intercept and infer user profiles based on targeted ads, since
ad’s traffic is sent in clear text [6]. We presume that users
do not wish to be exposed to their private interests and are
willing to receive relevant ads based on their interests.
In addition, another problem being addressed where
(user) clients or servers outsource their functionalities
(e.g. a firewall to monitor incoming/outgoing transactions
for authorising various entities to access particular ser-
vice/resource) to a third party e.g. to cloud system (CS).
Hence, in addition to private ads targeting, the user wishes
to have private outsource functionalities where any third
party, including CS, does not learn the policies implemented.
2.4 Threat Model
Our privacy goal in this work is to decouple, and hence
limit the information leakage to either advertising systems
or third party, (mobile) users from (advertising) servers for
their interactions, hence, various functionality (i.e. policies)
are implemented by cloud on their (both user’s and server’s)
behalf. In addition, we limit the information leakage for
various other activities e.g., tracking user’s for their activ-
ities, billing for ad presentation and ad click etc. To an ex-
tent, we emulate the “traditional” setting where the mobile
user’s profiling is entirely implemented on user’s side i.e.
Miner, hence revealing no information of user profiling to
advertising systems. The Miner requests for corresponding
encrypted ads associated with hash of profile’s interests.
Hence, the CS only learns the match for some unknown
(hashed profile’s interests) data along with the correspond-
ing other (encrypted ads) data pointers, i.e. any entity in CS
is assumed to be an honest-but-curious.
3 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
Figure 2 shows various components of proposed system.
3.1 Evaluating Advertisements
The Ad Placement Server (APS) groups advertisements
according to various interest categories for targeting users
with specific interests. The advertising system calculates as
a similarity match between individual interests and the set
of ads; where individual interests and ads are characterised
by a set of keywords11. The similarity is calculated based
on the tf · idf metric [33]. We note that this strategy is not
metric specific and that other similarity metrics might be
used. Let D is the set of ads from all the advertisers wanting
to advertise with an advertising agency. Each ad AdID is
represented with a unique identifier ID = 1, ..., D and is
characterised by κAdID keywords. Let the function f returns
the set of keywords of an ad i.e. f (AdID) = κAdID from the
pre-defined list of ads and their corresponding keywords.
These set of keywords are then used by another function g
for calculating an appropriate interest(s) by calculating the
similarity between the ad’s keywords κAdID and the list of
keywords of individual interests i.e. κk,l.
g (κAdID ) = κk,l : sim (κk,l, κAdID ) =⋃
∀Ad′ID∈D
max
(
sim
(
κk,l, κAd′ID
))
(7)
This similarity sim (κk,l, κAdID ) based on tf · idf is
calculated as follows: Let t be a particular keyword in κAdID
and d be the set of keywords in κk,l; then the term frequency
(occurrences of a particular keyword t in d) is tft,d. The
inverse document frequency of t ∈ κAdID within d is calculated
as idft = log Ndft , where N is the collection of keywords of
interests in Interest categories and the dft is the document fre-
quency that is the number of Interest categories that contain
t. The tf · idf is then calculated as tf · idft,d = tft,d × idft.
Thus the score for κAdID can be calculated as:
score (κAdID , d) =
∑
t∈κAdID
tf · idft,d (8)
The similarity score ranges 0 ≤ score ≤ 1 for individual
ads, where an ad (or a set of ads) with highest similarity
match to profile interests is calculated as a candidate ad for
gk,l and is assigned to particular interest e.g. gk,l ← Ad57.
Note that a single ad can be assigned to various profiling
interests, hence, targeting vast majority of audience. This
process is continued for entire set of advertisements. Note
[31] that the served ads are either URLs of the sponsoring
merchants (advertisers) or they are related to e.g. the Google
Play Store apps/games12 i.e. self-advertising. Recall, an app
marketplace includes a set of A mobile apps/games ai,j ,
grouped in different categories, characterised by a set of
keywords i.e. κi,j . We argue that such advertisements can
either be evaluated through the sim (κk,l, κi,j) similarity
metric or a direct match between the profiling Interests’ Ψl
and Apps’ Φj categories e.g. using Jaccard Index ΨlΦj .
3.2 Hashing Ads and Encrypted Profile Interests
All the advertisements are associated with various pro-
file interests, as mentioned in previous step. The advertis-
ing server now evaluates the hashes for all the interests
gk,l : ∀k ∈ Gl, l ∈  under individual categories Ψl, i.e.
h (gk,l); in addition, the corresponding ads are encrypted
(e.g. using RSA) i.e. Enc (AdID), we call this dataset a
‘profiling-ads’. Note that this operation is done just
11. The advertising agency and the advertiser agree on various
keywords so as to describe advertisements.
12. https://play.google.com/store/apps
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Fig. 2: A framework for secure user profiling and Blockchain-based targeted advertising system for in-app mobile ads.
once during system initialisation or every time new ads are
added to the system for advertising. Each hash references
various set of ads e.g. h (gk,l) → Enc (AdID1, . . . , AdIDN ),
which means that a user with specific h (gk,l) will be targeted
with AdID1, . . . , AdIDN ads.
3.3 Storing profiling-ads in CS
Once the set of profiling interests and their corresponding
ads (i.e. profiling-ads) are ready, the APS can upload
it to Cloud Storage (CS), which is carried out through an
anonymous process similar to those discussed in [34]. Note
that APS need to go through the access policy mechanism
to upload (store) the profiling interests and correspond-
ing ads. For this, APS sends a request to CS for storing
profiling-ads, requests the pointer to the first block Pb,
and the confirmation for availability of storage space. The
CS evaluates access policy for APS to confirm whether the
request is coming from legitimate party and to allow APS
to use storage space. Once the APS is allowed to store the
profiling-ads data; the CS encrypts the Pb with PK+
and sends it to APS along with the the storage-block
B i.e. the capacity of storage block within CS for saving
information on physical disk for spanned organisation of
storing data. Following, the APS evaluates the blocking
factor bfr to calculate the number of block to be occupied
by profiling-ads and sends it to the CS. Subsequent,
APS decrypts the Pb with PK− to extract the Pb, creates
a random ID, and starts sending profiling-ads to CS.
The CS calculates the hash of the received data, compares it
with the received hash, and (upon its validity) stores the
profiling-ads data. Since APS needs to send (a high
volume) data in several transactions; for this, the CS sends
a new Pb (encrypted with the PK+) to APS.
3.4 Miner (System App)
The System App sits on a user’s devices, which performs a
range of various tasks: deriving user profiles as outlined in
Section 2.2, uploads hashed user profiles to CS, requests ads
from CS through CH, and delivers requested ads to mobile
apps while fulfilling advertising quota, discussed in detail
in Section 4. The Miner processes all incoming and out-
going requests using a range of various transaction types,
as discussed in Section 4.3. The Miner authorises various
apps participating in profiling or requesting ads via access
policy (discussed in Section 3) and authenticates various
transaction types. In addition, Miner stores the list PK+
allocated to each mobile app, which the Miner only uses to
evaluate the request coming from a legitimate app (see Sec-
tion 3 for details). Note that, as opposed to legacy approach
towards ad request or click [2], [6], [15] i.e. encapsulating
app’ name; only the app’s PK+ is encapsulated in ad-
block that ensures anonymity and privacy. Miner’s additional
functions include: evaluating billing for ads, generating Gen-
esis transaction, distributing and updating keys, forming
ad-block, monitoring user’s activity for apps, updating and
uploading user profiles on removal of mobile apps.
Note that, in order to calculate user profiles, the Miner
communicates, similar way as AdMob SDK13 interacts, with
installed mobile apps. We are planning an enhanced version
of System App for future work aiming at user profiling (e.g.
frequency of apps usage) for optimising user targeting.
3.5 Billing
We suggest the use of mining any Cryptocurrencies for our
billing mechanism. We already proposed a billing mecha-
nism within an advertising environment [2], using Priced
Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (PSPIR) [35] that
is originally proposed for private ecommerce along with
polynomial commitments14 and Zero Knowledge Proofs
(ZKP)15. However, we suggest the use of Cryptocurrency
13. https://admob.google.com/
14. A polynomial commitment [36] allows constant-sized commit-
ments to polynomials (independent of their degree), where the com-
mitted value is an evaluation of this polynomial for specific inputs;
consequently, only this value (rather than the polynomial coefficients)
will be revealed in the opening phase.
15. ZKP [37] is an interactive protocol that enables one party, the
prover, to prove to the verifier that a particular statement is true, while
the latter learns no additional information regardless of any a priori
knowledge he may posses.
7for privacy, secure payment and for compatibility with the
underlying proposed advertising system over Blockchain.
To enable private billing, we denote the price tags CAdIDprs
and CAdIDclk respectively for ad presentation and ad click
operations. The Advertiser IDID buys the airtime from ad
agencies for advertising their ads. To initiate Billing
transaction for buying airtime; the advertiser uses her private
key (PK−) and signs message with the amount of Cryp-
tocurrency (e.g. Bitcoin) and Billing server’s address,
requesting a transaction. The billing request transaction is
bind with other transactions and is broadcasted to the
network, where another miner validates the transaction.
The process of transaction completes and the Billing
server receives its portion of Cryptocurrency in her wallet.
Similarly, the Miner initiate Billing transaction for ads
presentations16 or clicks respectively by encoding the CAdIDprs
and CAdIDclk price tags within Billing transaction. Note
that the Miner keeps track of ads presented to a particular
app in tracking-list, which is forwarded to CH only for
those ads that were not presented until the next (e.g. 24hrs)
session for the purpose of informing CS about the fulfillment
of advertising quota. We use the following notations for
representing various symbols/entities: price tags CAdIDprs
and CAdIDclk for ad presentation and click; various wallets
i.e. App Developer’s walletIDAPP , Advertiser’s walletADID ,
Billing Server’s walletBS ; and (Bitcoin) addresses, i.e.
AddIDAPP , AddADID , AddBS . Future work is planned for
integrating complete implementation and applicability of
Cryptocurrency in billing for advertising system.
3.6 Access Control
The Miner implements access policy (i.e. local-policy), holding
an access control list that allows apps regarding evaluation of
different operations e.g. to check whether an app is allowed
to request for ads, billing etc. The policies are also imple-
mented at CS (i.e. outsource-policy, the CS processes policies
on behalf of Miner i.e. executes policy on incoming trans-
action requests destined for accessing various resources i.e.
accessing ads) to allow access to various ads evaluated for
various profile interests and to CH for processing ad-block for
requesting ads from CS on Miner’s behalf. Note that, instead
of introducing a policy header (as suggested by [34]), we
evaluate the access from various options present in the ad-
block (as shown in Figure 4) for efficient access and reduced
overhead.
As shown in Figure 4, we represent the policies as bi-
nary tree Tp consisting of left child li (Tp) and right child
ri (Tp) along with the matching function m (li (Tp)), which
is represented as an edge between different (child) nodes
and the action function a (li (Tp)). The pair (m, a) is a Policy.
There is a list of action functions A (mainly allow or disallow
and route to next level of Tp) and the matching functions
M i.e. the exact policy to implement, such that a ∈ A,
m ∈ M . An example set of M that Miner implements are:
Calculate ads quota, Apps to participate in billing, Profile
16. For reducing processing and communication overhead and en-
hanced operation, the Miner initiates Billing transaction once suffi-
cient ads are shown to the user within a session whereas the Billing
transaction for click operation is initiated as soon a click operation is
triggered.
l1
l2
l3
l4
r1
r2
r3
r4
ad-block?
ad-structure?
ad-request?
profile-storage?
(a) (b)
Tp
li ri
matching
allow-action deny-action
clash
Tp
Fig. 3: An example implementation of policy tree along with
various actions (a) and a simple access policy implemented at
CS for Miner (b).
establishment, Show ads within app, Apps to change public
key etc. A simple example policy structure is given in Figure
3 (b) implemented at CS that consists of four pairs of distinct
policies: (m1, a1) , (m2, a2) , (m3, a3) , (m4, a4). The CS use
these policies to permit Miner for requesting various actions.
Here, m1 is a match for evaluating Miner for its permission
for requesting ad-block, likewise, m4 for storing profile in CS.
We suggest to use Multi-version of access policy i.e. cre-
ating a separate copy for read (Tp) and modify (Tp) policy
document. This will ensure that the read (Tp) copy is only ac-
cessed for reading purpose, hence, a number of transactions
are allowed to access the copy of access policy. Note that the
Miner has to indicate the type of transaction, as mentioned
Trans. Type in Figure 4, under the Ad-Block-Structure.
4 AD-BLOCK STRUCTURE
In this section, we present the block structure for various
transactions for an ad-request/response for operating within
the Blockchain network.
4.1 Ad Block Header Request/Response
Figure 4 presents the structure of a transaction (e.g. an
ad-request) ‘Ad-Block-Header-Request’ (upper) for ad-
request, ‘Ad-Block-Header-Response’ (middle) for ad-
response and the ‘Ad-Block-Structure’ (lower) in a
Blockchain network scenario. This block is generated by
the System App, a Miner sitting in user’s mobile devices,
for requesting an ad (for showing in an app) form CH.
The TID denotes the transaction’s unique identifier, which
is the hashed value of the other fields of this transaction.
Note that the first transaction (or block) is called the Genesis
transaction, which lays the foundation on which additional
blocks are sequentially added to form (sequential ledger by
connecting current transaction with the previous transaction
using PTID) a chain of blocks. PTID represents the identi-
fier of the previous transaction that is used for establishing
connection between the current and previous transactions.
The input i.e. all the request ad transactions are made to the
Miner’s address, enlists all the ads that the CH has already
sent to the Miner within a particular session. Note that both
the CH and Miner keep track of the already served ads so
that they are not presented again to user within the same
session. We take the session as the time duration where
user utilises a particular mobile app until she exits the
8application or there is no activity for a considerable (e.g.
24hrs) time duration. The Ad-block with used “input” is then
served to a different (Miner) user, which upon used by the
current Miner becomes and stored in the output field.
The IDU 17 represents (user) advertising ID that iden-
tifies user’s mobile device (detailed discussion over IDU
can be found in [2]). We suggest that IDU does not change
for a particular session. This will help in keeping track
of ads shown to the users, in addition to, billing where
app developer’s (IDApp) wallet is populated with partic-
ular amount of Cryptocurrency. Note that for simplicity
we represent IDApp both for identifying app’s developer
(Developer ID) and name of the mobile app. The AdID is
the ID of the advertisement shown to the user. The (mobile)
Miner also keeps track of particular ads in order to fulfil ad’s
advertising quota18; Table 2 presents an example tracking of
advertising quota e.g. the advertisement ‘DEF’ still needs to
be presented 50% app airtime.
Date/Time Advertisement Frequency Served
04/02/2020:10:45:52 ABC 100 65%
05/02/2020:01:23:41 DEF 67 50%
TABLE 2: An example tracking advertising quota.
Furthermore, the Ad is the actual content of the adver-
tisements that are presented to users within mobile apps; the
contents of an ad varies over different sizes of Min ad size
of 12KB, the Max size of 20KB and the Avg ad of 16KB,
as observed in [2]. Similarly, ADID is the advertiser’s ID
of particular advertisement(s), which is used to deduct
advertiser’s Bitcoin wallet (detailed discussion over billing
is given in 3.5).
To enable communication in a Blockchain network, the
peers of a Blockchain network require a Public-Private Key
pair i.e. represented with PK + /− in Figure 4, which is
used to increase the anonymity. The Sign field contains the
signature of the transaction generator (e.g. Miner (System
app)) using the public-private key pair. Following illustrates
to understand the exchange of data between Miner and CH
(e.g., Miner sends an ad-request to CH): Miner encrypts the
ad-request transaction data using CH’s public key PK+ and
then creates a signature by taking the hash of ad-request and
encrypts it using her (Miner’s) private key PK−. The transac-
tion data is encrypted along with the digital signature is in-
cluded in the Ad-Block-Header-Request/Response. Subsequent,
this transaction is broadcasted over the Blockchain network,
since it is addressed19 to CH, hence CH starts verifying
the transaction contents by decrypting the digital signature
using Miner’s public key while decrypts the transaction data
using her (CH’s) private key. Note that CH verifies the trans-
action data by comparing the ad- request hash to the hashed
data in digital signature, detailed discussion can be found
in [40]. We suggest to, similar to [41], store the public key in
PK + /− field for reducing the size of the transaction and
17. IDU can be reset via the Google Settings System App on Android
devices
18. This requirement comes from the advertising agency, where a
particular is presented for certain frequency [31], [38].
19. The peer’s address in a Blockchain network is obtained by cal-
culating the cryptographic hash of user’s public key e.g. in Bitcoin, the
SHA-256 encryption algorithm is used for deriving user addresses [39].
for future proof transactions i.e. to prevent from malicious
attacks where intruders could possibly reconstruct private
key using public key.
The transactions, included in block, are being hashed by
the Miner as part of the Merkle tree; the transactions stored
are lead to the Merkle root stored in the block header. As
mentioned in [39], the block header being part of the longest
chain with Merkle root is used for different purposes, such
as Simple Payment Verification (SPV), and it also speeds up
the process of verifying the membership of a transaction in
a block. An example Merkle tree, for 8 different ad-requests
(leaf nodes represented with AdTX1 to AdTX8 on the left),
including internal hashed nodes and Merkle root node is
shown Figure 5. The hash value of a transaction (e.g. an ad-
request) is stored in these leaf nodes; note that we presume
a binary Merkle tree that has 2n−1 leaf nodes with n height.
An example slice of a Merkle tree with n = 8 is also
shown on the right of Figure 5. The yellow nodes are the
potential hashed nodes that potentially could be pruned for
reclaiming disk space, details for node pruning can be found
in [39].
4.2 Ad Block Structure
The lower part of Figure 4 shows the structure of
an Ad-block ‘Ad-Block-Structure’ consisting of the
Ad-Block-Header Request/Response and the list of
some or all recent (pending) ad-request transactions. Recall
that a Miner orders the pending transactions into a block
until it reaches the pre-defined block size, as mentioned,
blocks in a Blockchain are connected through hashes of
previous blocks.
4.3 Ad Block Transaction Types
Various types of communication done among different par-
ties of a Blockchain are enabled via transaction, where
different types of transactions are designated for various
purposes. E.g. a Billing transaction is enabled for calcu-
lating billing for various ads presented in mobile apps or
when the user clicks on particular ads AdID, as presented
in Section 3.5. Similarly, the Access, Upload, and Update
transaction types are respectively used for accessing profile20,
uploading the profile, or when the user profile changes. In
addition, the Request and Response transaction, as dis-
cussed above, for requesting ads from CS or response ads
from CS. Furthermore, the Genesis transaction is when the
Miner starts participating in Blockchain network. Note that
the Genesis transaction is generated for every installed
app or for every new app being installed on the device,
however, grouped by the app developer IDApp. Hence, all
the activities i.e. ad-request, ad-response, billing IDApp and
ADID both for presented and clicked ads, and participation
in profiling are chained together and are tracked for all
these activities from current block to the Genesis block.
In addition, a Remove transaction type is used to uninstall
an app, indicating that the user might not be interested in
this specific category of app and also its contribution to user
20. Note that the users upload profiles to CS, as explained in Algo-
rithm 4, which can be accessed by the user when she signs-in to another
device or losses her profile.
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profile. Lastly, the Monitor transaction is generated by the
Miner to monitor activity of each app for various operations
of ad-request, ad-response etc. Note that the transactions are
secured via asymmetric encryption, digital signatures and
cryptographic hash functions (e.g. SHA-256). Furthermore,
the lightweight hashing [42] is employed to detect any
changes in the transaction’s content.
5 AD-BLOCK OPERATIONS
This section presents the design requirements of a
Blockchain-based mobile advertising system and the design
of various algorithms describing comprehensive operations
of its various components.
5.1 Design Requirements
The system is designed by taking into account various
requirements: privacy, reduced overhead over (user) client,
compatibility of billing with Cryptocurrency, efficiency at ad
network and client.
Privacy: The underlying design uses Blockchain
technology for preserving user privacy, hence various trans-
actions are buried under the structure of Blockchain transac-
tion for ad-request, ad-click, billing etc., hence, the ad network
does not learn any information from these various opera-
tions. In traditional advertising setting, the APS establishes
user profiling with the help of cookies [31] and communi-
cates with the mobile devices for various other operations of
ad presentation, click etc. However, in proposed method, the
Miner constructs user profiles locally on the user device21,
hashes of profile interests gk,l and uploads to CS or utilise
it for various operations including billing. The CS learns
no information about user’s interests, either during policy
checking or accomplishing various operations.
Reduced overhead over (user) client: It is critical to
impose marginal overhead over Miner, hence, it is made op-
tional for user devices to participate as a Miner or request CH
to construct ad-request, henceforth, the Miner sends h (IDU )
and h (IDAPP ). However, it is crucial for Miner to evaluate
various other essential operations (i.e. a trade-off between
privacy and operational overheads) in order to enable a pri-
vate and secure advertising system, e.g., constructing user
profile and uploading to CS, keep updating the tracking-list,
billing for ads, and initiating the Genesis transaction. The
aim is to achieve reduced infrastructure cost, efficiency, and
flexibility.
Compatibility of billing with Cryptocurrency: The
biggest industries, such as travel, banking sectors, are in-
clined towards adapting the Cryptocurrency that will bring
industries, government and community together. In addi-
tion, the number of mobile internet users have surpassed 4
billion mark22 and is set to continue growing in the future.
This proposal is an effort to adapt the Cryptocurrency in
advertising system for providing a platform for embedding
Cryptocurrency for billing various parties within the ad
system.
Efficiency at ad network and (user) client: The
Blockchain based advertising system should be computa-
21. Among other functionality, an important feature of the proposed
architecture is to reduce interaction between user device and advertis-
ing system, hence the ad system will not be able to learn more about
user’s activities.
22. https://99firms.com/blog/mobile-marketing-statistics/
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tionally fast with reduced computation and, in specific,
communication cost. As evident in [31], in traditional in-
app advertising setting using Google AdMob, a mobile app
requesting an ad and the triggered action from e.g. a user
click, consists of a series of different steps: The mobile app
sends a POST message passing various information about
the device including phone version, model, app running on
phone etc.; the ad server sends ad containing web address,
JavaScript, static objects; cookie for tracking user’s ac-
tion; the web server associated with the ad is contacted and
the landing page is downloaded and is shown to the user.
Note that the mobile app developer agree on integrating
ads in mobile apps by embedding ad/analytics library. It
was also evident that the ads are refreshed every 15–20sec
and all the above steps are followed for every single ad
presentation and its associated click, hence, severely affect-
ing throughput. This proposal reduces the communication
overhead by sending a pool of ads with single ad-request
transaction and locally serving ads. In addition, the APS
uploads the profiling-ads set only during the system
initialisation or when new advertiser is added to the system.
Following illustrates the idea behind various operations
of the Blockchain-based advertising system.
5.2 The Blockchain-based Advertising System
The initial step is performed by APS via Algorithm 1. This
includes evaluating profiling-ads and then uploading
the profile interests gk,l and corresponding ads AdID to CS.
Input: gk,l; AdID; Lk,l
1 Run Lk,l = Profiling (gk,l; AdID)
2 Run Storage (Lk,l)
Algorithm 1: Global Setup (APS)
Once the APS completes evaluating profiling-ads, it
uploads this dataset to CS using Algorithm 3 requesting the
pointer to the first block Pb for data storage. We assume
that the storage in CS consists of various blocks of size
B i.e. storage-block, where each B can accommodate
numerous records, hence to evaluate various data records
that could be fit in one block. The APS sends the bfr i.e.
Blocking factor, to CS to accordingly reserve the storage
space for profiling-ads. Following, the APS starts send-
ing the profiling-ads and progressively asks the Pb to
next available B.
The CS runs the Algorithm 7 for evaluating access per-
mission. To initiate this process, the CS creates a read (Tp),
sets s to the initial node in Tp, and starts traversing through
Tp. Recall an example tree-structured policy shown in Figure
3, representing k = 4 distinct policies and corresponding
matching criteria m and their resultant action functions a.
During the traversal, if a match is found, the corresponding
action is performed, however, the policy traversal terminates
whenever a leaf node is entered.
The Algorithm 4 illustrates the procedure for storing
user profiles on CS, once constructed as a result of Profile
development process, as explained in Section 2.1. The Miner
first evaluates the cryptographic hash, using SHA-256, of
individual profile’s interests and then uploads to CS using
Input: gk,l; AdID
1 Initialise empty list Lk,l with k × l cells.
2 for ID = 1, . . . , D do
3 κAdID ← f (AdID)
4 for l = 1, ...,  do
5 for k = 1, ..., Gl do
6 Evaluate:
core (κAdID , d) =
∑
t∈κAdID
tf.idft,d;
∀AdID,∀gk,l
7 end
8
⋃
∀AdID∈D
max
(
sim
(
κk,l, κAd′ID
))
;
9 Lk,l · add (gk,l, AdID)
10 end
11 end
12 Evaluate hashes of profile interests and corresponding
ads in Lk,l.
13 for m = 1, . . . , len (Lk,l) do
14 hm (gk,l) ; EncPK+ (AdID)
15 L∗
k,l
.add (hm (gk,l) , EncPK+ (AdID))
16 end
17 Return
(
L∗k,l
)
Algorithm 2: Profiling(gk,l; AdID)
Input: Lk,l
1 APS requests CS to store Lk,l
2 APS.request (Pb) from CS
3 if (Run Access Policy (APS)) then
4 if !(storage full) then
5 CS sends storage-block B to APS.
6 CS.send (EncPK+ (Pb)) to APS
7 end
8 end
9 APS sends bfr =
⌈
len (Lk,l)/B
⌉
10 APS DecPK− (Pb)
11 APS generates random ID
12 for i = 1, . . . , bfr do
13 APS.send (ID,Lk,l [i] , h (Lk,l) , EncPK+ (Pb))
14 if h (Lk,l) = CS.calc (h (Lk,l)) AND Transaction is
valid then
15 CS.store (Lk,l [i])
16 CS.send (EncPK+ (Pb = Pb + 1))
17 end
18 end
Algorithm 3: Storage (Lk,l), APS
Algorithm 3. In addition, the CS also evaluates Algorithm 7
to allow/disallow Miner IDU .
The ad-request consist of various steps, as outlined in
Algorithm 5 and depicted in left side of Figure 2 i.e. User
Environment. The mobile app IDAPP first requests Miner
for the ads to display to user; Step (1) of Figure 2. The
Miner also implements an Access Policy to evaluate the ad
request coming from legitimate app. Consequently, the Miner
constructs an Ad-Block using Ad-Block-Header-Request
by encoding IDU , IDAPP etc., Step (2) of Figure 2. Detailed
procedure for constructing Ad-Block-Header-Request
11
Input: ai,j ∈ Sa; dm,n ∈ Sd
1 Establishment: Ig via use of ai,j ∈ Sa
2 Map Sa to Si,jg ; Ig ← Si,jg
3 Evaluate dm,n; Ig ← dm,n
4 Evolution: Ifg ← Ig ∪ S′i,jg ∪ d′m,n
5 Evaluate hashes of profile interests.
6 for m = 1, . . . , len
(
Ifg
)
) do
7 hm (gk,l); gk,l ∈ Si,jg ∈ Ifg
8 I∗g .add (h
m (gk,l))
9 end
10 Run Storage
(
I∗g
)
, Miner(IDU )
Algorithm 4: Profiling-Storage (Miner)
is also given in Section 4.1. Following, the Miner sends Ad-
Block to CS (Step (3) of Figure 2), which the CH forwards
to CS (Step (4) of Figure 2) for fetching ads according to
various gk,l of IDU . The ad-response (Step (5) of Figure 2)
is encoded using Ad-Block-Header-Response as shown
in Figure 4 (middle), illustrated in Section 4.1. Finally, the
Miner sends the fetched ads to mobile app for display within
active session (i.e. Step (7) of Figure 2).
1 IDAPP requests ads from Miner
2 Run Access Policy (IDAPP )
3 Miner constructs Ad-Block using IDU , IDAPP , · · ·
4 Miner sends Ad-Block to CS
5 Run Access Policy (IDU )
6 CH forwards request to CS
7 Run Access Policy (CH)
8 Fetch ads according to (IDU ) profile interests from CS
9 Send h (Ad1, · · · , AdN ) to CH
10 CH sends set of ads to Miner
11 Miner presents ads to Mobile app and updates
tracking-list
Algorithm 5: Ads-Request (Miner)
The Miner corresponds to BS for billing for ad presentation
and ad click operations via Algorithm 6, see Section 3.5
for detailed description of billing. In order to avoid the
communication and computation overhead, we propose to
periodically evaluate the billing (e.g. every 24hrs) for ad pre-
sentation through calculating the fulfillment of advertising
quota. However, for click operation, the billing mechanism is
initiated as soon as a click operation is triggered. Note that
u and v are the proportions of billing amount (in Cryptocur-
rency) respectively paid to walletIDAPP and walletBS .
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now discuss our experimental evaluation i.e., the pro-
cessing time for generating public-private key (PK+/−) pairs
with various key sizes and the encryption and decryption
time of advertiser’s ads with different number of interests
along with its effect over selecting a range of public-private
key sizes. Note that this wide selection of options affect the
ad presentation time that include the processing time (includ-
ing access policy traversing time, matching profile hashing at
CS for fetching relevant ads, the transmission delay (bigger
sizes of advertiser’s ads are subject to longer transmission
Input: CAdIDprs ; C
AdID
clk ; walletIDAPP ; walletADID ;
walletAS
1 Ad Presentation:
2 Deduct: Bprs = walletADID − CAdIDprs
3 Billing transaction to pay App Developer:
walletIDAPP ←
(
Bprs/m
)
4 Billing transaction to pay Billing server:
walletBS ←
(
Bprs/n
)
5 Ad Click:
6 Deduct: Bclk = walletADID − CAdIDclk
7 Billing transaction to pay App Developer:
walletIDAPP ←
(
Bclk/m
)
8 Billing transaction to pay Billing server:
walletBS ←
(
Bclk/n
)
Algorithm 6: Billing (IDApp, ADID, AdID)
Input: read (Tp), modify (Tp), Tp
1 s = li (Tp)
2 while traverse until s is leaf node do
3 if li (Tp) is not leaf then
4 li (Tp) = 1
5 if access is allowed then
6 Move to the left child.
7 s = li (Tp)
8 Evaluate (mi, ai)
9 else
10 Move to the right child.
11 s = ri (Tp)
12 end
13 else
14 if li (Tp) is leaf node then
15 Move to the right child.
16 s = ri (Tp)
17 Exit
18 end
19 end
20 end
Algorithm 7: Access Policy (Node)
delays), which in turn dominates the overall communication
delay i.e. the response back from CS to Miner for ad request.
Following, to analyze the scalability of the our proposed
framework, we evaluate the processing delays for varying
number of traversed rules and corresponding actions, rep-
resented with different shapes of access policy trees.
6.1 Experimental setup
Evaluations were performed on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2620M
CPU @2.70GHz and 8GB or RAM; we use a Python mod-
ule cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric
from RSA for generating PK + /− key pairs and for evalu-
ating AES encryption/decryption time of advertiser’s ads
with different sizes of ad’s contents. We generate 10,000
PK + /− key pairs with a range of selection of various
key sizes (i.e. 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096 bits) (i.e., we stress-
test the proposed framework with continuously generating
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a total of 40,000 PK + /− key pairs) and evaluate the key
pair generation time. Note that the PK + /− key pairs are
generated once and are used for various other operations.
Following, we generate 1000 user profiles by randomly
selecting up to 20 different profile interests23 representing
users with diverse interests, equally divide them into 10
groups consisting of 100 user profiles (i.e. P1, P2, . . . , P10).
Figure 9(a) shows user profile groups uniformly distributed
from 1000 user profiles that consist of various profile inter-
ests with 10.53 Avg interests with a St.Dev of 5.88 inter-
ests. We calculate the hashes of these profiles using SHA1,
SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, and SHA512 hashing schemes.
Furthermore, we generate 1000 advertiser’s ads
with random sizes of between 12KB to 20KB24 and
equally divide them into 10 groups consisting of 100
randomly chosen ads (i.e. A1, A2, . . . , A10). Figure 6
shows advertiser’s ads groups uniformly selected from
1000 ads with various sizes, with an Avg size of 15943B
(i.e. 15.94KB) and a St.Dev of 2364B. Following, we
evaluate the AES encryption/decryption time of these
groups of ads with various key sizes of 512, 1024, 2048,
and 4096 bits. Note that in order to encrypt ads of
arbitrary length, we use hybrid encryption i.e. RSA to
asymmetrically encrypt a symmetric key. To do this, we
first randomly generate a symmetric encryption key using
AES and encrypt the ads, then, we encrypt the AES key
using PK+ generated with RSA and transmit both the
AES-encrypted ads and RSA-encrypted AES key to the
Miner. Following, to decrypt the ad’s contents, the Miner
first decrypts the RSA block using PK+ to discover the
AES symmetric key and then decrypt the symmetrically
encrypted ads using AES to discover the resultant set of ads.
Similarly, we construct the Ad-Block-Structure for ad-
request/response by including Ad-Block-Header-Request
or Ad-Block-Header-Response (by encoding
Min = 12KB,Max = 20KB sizes of ad’ content [2])
respectively for requesting data for ad presentation by the
Miner and the response back from CS to Miner.
6.2 Beskpoke Miner
We develop a bespoke version of the Miner, we made signif-
icant changes to implement some of its functionalities, such
as generating an ad-block, transactions with different policy
requests etc., on an Android-based device. We implement
Miner on Google Nexus 7, ARM Cortex-A9 Nvidia Tegra,
1GB RAM, 1.2 GHz quad-core. To implement various func-
tionalities, first we install CyanogenMod that is a custom
ROM for Android devices in order to get root access
and developer capabilities. We then add support for the
standard Linux utilities, in order to implement various
Miner functionalities, that are not generally ported as part
of the Android OS. The Android OS is equipped with Bionic
C library25 instead of Glibc26 i.e. the standard GNU C li-
brary, found on most Unix variant operating systems, which
23. Note that apps generate a very limited number of profile interests,
as evident in [5].
24. The selection of these sizes of ads are based on our prior works,
which has characterized in-app mobile ads [5], [31].
25. https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bionic/
26. http://www.gnu.org/software/libc/
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enable Android OS to achieve high performing standard C
library with small memory and disk footprint. Following,
we make both the Glibc and Bionic coexist on Android plat-
form using the chroot system call in order to use Linux’s
utilities; this step also enables us to create Ubuntu Linux file
system, which we can run a complete Debian environment
on top of the Android kernel ARM CPU support OS. These
various layers of functionalities are presented in Figure 7.
Android Kernel (Linux)
running on ARMv7 Cortex-A9
Android File-System with Bionic 
Lib-C
Chrooted Debian File-system 
with Glib-C 
Policy
CS
Miner (Android tablet)
Ad-Block-Structure
Trans. Type  .   .   .
Transaction types  
e.g. Request, 
response, genesis 
etc. Incoming transaction 
request
Root node
L
ea
f 
n
o
d
eRequester 
Module
Fig. 7: Runtime architecture for a bespoke Miner.
To implement a system module of access policy and to
evaluate the system performance under different shapes of
access trees, we set our CS to store 100, 200, . . . , 1000 set
of rules and matches with root node at random positions
between min = 1 to max = n, n = {100, 200, . . . , 1000}
representing various shapes of trees with nodes (i.e. match-
ing rules and corresponding actions) present on both sides.
E.g. for a tree of 1000 nodes with root node set to 1 or 1000
means that the entire set of matching rules and corresponding
actions are present respectively on the right and left side of
the root node, similarly, the set of rules and matches are
equally distributed on both sides with the position of root
node at position 500. We repeat this experiment for 1000
13
times for each of various trees of 100, 200, . . . , 1000 nodes
with randomly selecting root nodes at different positions.
Note that for each request, in order to stress test the system,
we deliberately put the matching rule for every access policy
request at the leaf node of any specific tree, hence traversing
the entire tree for each matching rules. We configure the
Requester module (i.e. inside the Miner as depicted in
Figure 7) to launch these requests, with above setting, to CS
(we experiment our CS with the same specs as presented
in Section 6.1), as shown at the bottom of Figure 7. The
processing delay is evaluated at CS for all these experiments,
along with Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev of root node placement
positions and processing delays.
6.3 Experimental results
Processing delay for generating PK + /−: Our first
evaluation is to explore the effect of PK + /− key pair
size over the key pair generation time. Figure 8 shows
the performance in terms of processing delays evaluate to
Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev for generating PK + /− key pair
with various sizes of 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096 bits. E.g. the
Min and Max processing time for generating 10,000 keys
with key size of 512 bits respectively is 0.005sec and 0.35sec
with an Avg delay of 0.05sec and 0.03 St.Dev. We note that
the Avg power trendline results in a curve with 0.002sec slope
and a 0.86 of r − squared value, as the key size is increased
from 512 to 4096 bits. The Avg key generation delay is also
written on top of each PK + /− key pairs with various key
sizes.
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Fig. 8: Processing delay for generating 40,000 PK + /− key
pairs with various key sizes of 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096
bits.
Processing time of Hashing of user profiles: Figure
9(b) shows the processing time of hashing various user pro-
files with SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 hash-
ing schemes, showing the Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev process-
ing time (msec) of P1, P2, . . . , P10 profile groups with differ-
ent hashing schemes. For instance, the Min and Max hash-
ing time with SHA1 are respectively 3msec and 15msec with
an Avg and St.Dev of 7.13msec and 1.02ms, while these
statistics respectively increase to 5msec, 36msec, 8.19msec
and 1.66msec using SHA512 hashing scheme. The Avg pro-
cessing time with each scheme is also shown on top of each
schemes. Note that this is a one time operation, which APS
calculates before calculating the profile hashing and their
relevant ads before profiling-ads to CS.
Enryption/decryption time of Advertiser’s ads:
Figure 10 shows the AES encryption (above row from
(a) to (d)) and AES decryption (below row from (e)
to (h)) time of various set of ads with different PK+
key sizes i.e. 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192 bits. The averages
of Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev processing time duration of
A1, A2, . . . , A10 advertiser’s ads groups is also shown
within each figure for both ad’s encryption time (sec) and
decryption time (sec) with each evaluation. For instance,
the Min and Max ad’s encryption time with 1024 bits key
size are respectively 0.0010sec and 0.0045sec with an Avg
and St.Dev of 0.0022sec 0.0007sec; on the other hand, with
8192 bits of key size, these statistics increase to 0.039sec and
0.0267sec respectively for Min and Max encryption time
with Avg and St.Dev of 0.0112msec and 0.0046sec. Note
that APS needs to encrypt ads only once i.e., at the time
of system initialization, as described in Algorithm 2, before
uploading to CS. Similarly, the decryption time (below row
of Figure 10) with Min and Max respectively evaluates to
0.0029sec and 0.0097sec with Avg and St.Dev of 0.0047sec
and 0.0013sec with 1024 bits of PK+ key size; on the other
hand, with 8192 bits of key size, these statistics evaluate
to 0.4520sec, 1.6588sec, 1.0819sec, and 0.3232sec respectively
for Min,Max,Avg and St.Dev.
Various statistics of Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev of AES
encryption and description processing time evaluated
from 1000 advertiser’s ads with various PK+ sizes of
1024, 2048, 4096, 8192 bits is presented in Table 3. Further-
more, the r − squred values calculated using exponential
trendline R2−Exp and power R2−Pow are also presented
that shows the relationship of increasing key size to the
encryption/decryption processing time of advertiser’s ads.
We note that there is a strong correlation between the PK+
key size and the ads’ encryption or decryption processing
time. For instance, Avg AES encryption processing time, the
R2 − Exp and power R2 − Pow evaluated respectively to
0.8921 and 0.7663 (which also evident with high values of
St.Dev for both R2 − Exp and R2 − Pow) showing that
the encryption time exponentially increases as the key size
is increased from 1024 to 8192.
Processing delay for traversing policies: To further
analyze the scalability of the our proposed framework, we
study the processing delay (note that this contributes to
the total delay of various transactions requested by Miner
or any other entity that requests CS for various services)
of Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev when varying the number of
traversed rules among 100, 200, . . . , 1000 access policy trees,
for both sequential and random distribution of policy tree i.e.
sequential/random root node placement. Figure 11 (b) shows
the random placement of root node for policy trees, storing
various nodes and matching rules of 100, 200, . . . , 1000
access policy trees. We note that the root node placement,
on average, perfectly follows a power distribution with
R2 −Pow value of 0.99, as the tree is populated with 100 to
1000 policies and matching rules. Similarly, theR2−Pow for
Max, St.Dev is also 0.99, suggesting formation of various
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Fig. 9: Randomly generated user profile (a) with Min = 1,Max = 20, Avg = 10.53, St.Dev = 5.88 profile interests.
Pi = 100user profiles; i = 1, . . . , 10. Processing time of hashing profiles (b) using SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384,
SHA512 hashing schemes.
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Fig. 10: AES Encryption time (a) to (d) and Decryption time (e) to (h) using 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192 bits of RSA PK+ key,
evaluated for A1, A2, . . . , A10 advertiser’s ads groups.
access policy with placement of root nodes at every possible
positions i.e., creating every possible shape of tree by plac-
ing nodes on both sides of the access policy trees.
Figure 11 (a) shows processing delay of
Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev access policy traversal delay
(msec) with various access trees; note that every experiment
has been repeated 1000 times. We observe that the average
processing delay increases with the number of rules with
a power trendline of 0.92. For instance, for a 100 and 1000
node’s policy tree, the Avg processing delay is respectively
0.0017sec and 0.0106sec, similarly, the Min processing
delay varies respectively from 0.001sec to 0.005sec. Detailed
statistics of root node placement and traversal delay is also
given in Table 4, evaluated for Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev
processing delays.
Following, we evaluate the processing delay using se-
quential (distribution) placement of root node (i.e. to eval-
uate traversal delay by placing root node at every single
position e.g. 1, 2, 3, . . . , 1000 for a tree of 1000 matching
rules and their actions) and compare it with the random
distribution. Figure 12 presents a CDF of processing delay
with both random and sequential placement of rood node;
various processing delays ofAvg,Min,Max, St.Dev is also
given at the right side of this figure. We note that 96% of
the processing delay ranges from 0.005sec to 0.014sec and
0.007sec to 0.032sec respectively for random and sequential
distribution of root node placement. Overall, the sequential
distribution resulted in higher processing delays as com-
pared to random distribution. Note that these processing
delay at CS can be considered acceptable i.e., close to real
time performance [2], [38], both during the app/website
launch time or delayed ad request.
7 RELATED WORK
Privacy threats resulting from collecting individual’s online
data i.e. direct and indirect (inferred) leakage, have been
investigated extensively in literature, e.g. [1], [43], [44], [45],
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Stats
Encryption Time (sec) Decryption Time (sec)
Key Size (bits) Trendline Key Size (bits) Trendline
1024 2048 4096 8192 R2-Exp R2-Pow 1024 2048 4096 8192 R2-Exp R2-Pow
Avg 0.0022 0.0031 0.0040 0.0112 0.8921 0.7663 0.0047 0.0229 0.1286 1.0819 0.9953 0.9320
Min 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0030 0.6000 0.4307 0.0020 0.0060 0.0440 0.3260 0.9839 0.8984
Max 0.0060 0.0120 0.0140 0.0420 0.9223 0.8496 0.0240 0.0710 0.5670 1.8070 0.9840 0.9323
St.Dev 0.0007 0.0014 0.0018 0.0046 0.9627 0.9008 0.0013 0.0097 0.0534 0.3308 0.9992 0.9690
TABLE 3: TheAvg,Min,Max, St.Dev of AES encryption and description processing time evaluated from 1000 advertiser’s
ads of various sizes with different PK+ sizes of 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192 bits.
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Fig. 11: Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev Processing delay (ms) per policy tree vs number of rules traversed (x1000) for each policy
matching requested by Miner (a) and root node placement for each set of policy trees (b).
Tree Size Policy Tree Processing Delay (sec) Policy Tree - Rood Node SelectionAvg Min Max St.Dev Avg Min Max St.Dev
100 0.0017 0.001 0.018 0.001 56.08
1
100 26.95
200 0.0037 0.001 0.025 0.002 106.63 200 53.63
300 0.0049 0.001 0.026 0.003 152.98 300 84.94
400 0.0067 0.001 0.023 0.003 202.37 400 115.29
500 0.0096 0.003 0.063 0.004 250.99 500 141.94
600 0.0122 0.003 0.046 0.005 301.90 600 166.34
700 0.0131 0.003 0.045 0.006 359.22 700 196.66
800 0.0131 0.003 0.071 0.007 393.72 800 224.08
900 0.0103 0.004 0.062 0.006 447.85 900 255.95
1000 0.0107 0.005 0.032 0.002 477.54 1000 271.96
R2 − Pow 0.9166 0.7491 0.5778 0.6673 0.9994 0.0436 0.9996 0.9991
R2 − Exp 0.7196 0.8497 0.4804 0.4553 0.9084 0.0303 0.8985 0.8940
TABLE 4: Avg,Min,Max, St.Dev Policy tree processing delay (sec) (left) and the random root node placement position
(right) for policy trees of 100, 200, . . . , 1000; the exponential trendline R2 − Exp and power R2 − Pow are also presented.
Each statistic is a result of 1000 experimental request.
including third party ad tracking and visiting [46], [47], [48],
[49]. These studies have shown the prevalence of tracking
on both web and mobile environments and demonstrate
the possibility of inferring user’s PII, such as age, gender,
relationship status, email address, etc. from their online
data. The ad and analytics libraries, integrated into mobile
apps, systematically collect personal information and users’
in-app activities and are more likely to leak this information
to ad systems and third party tracking. The authors in [50]
analyze the privacy policy for collecting in-app data by apps
and study various information collected by the analytics
libraries integrated in mobile apps.
Privacy and mobile advertising: There are number
of studies that focus on privacy leakage caused by ad
libraries within the mobile apps, e.g. the authors in [51]
show the potential privacy and security risk by analyzing
100,000 android apps and find that majority of the embed-
ded libraries collect private information. Another study [52]
finds that majority of the used APIs within mobile apps do
not implement private APIs and send private information
to ad servers. The authors in [53] manually create user
profiles and find that ads are vastly targeted based on
fabricated profiles, in addition to, apps used and location.
In our previous study [31] and in [38], the authors study
various information sent to ad networks and the level of
ads targeting based on communicated information, simi-
larly, [54] investigates installed apps for leaking targeted
user data. The authors in [55] studies the privacy risks
collected by ad libraries across various apps installed on a
single device called intra-library collusion; the longitudinal
analysis shows that leakage of information has increased in
the following two years. Furthermore, [45] studies the level
of information collected by the ad networks with the help of
installed and used apps, in addition, to reverse engineer the
targeted ads and investigate the collected information.
Privacy and mobile Analytics services: In our previ-
ous work [6], we study the user’s sensitive information leak-
age through the vulnerabilities in mobile analytics services
by analyzing actual network traffic generated by mobile
apps and reconstruct the exact user profiles of a number
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of participating volunteers. We mainly carry out this study
on android platform for Google Mobile Analytics and Flurry
Analytics. We further study how the ads served to users can
be influenced by modifying the user profiles generated by
these analytics services. Another study [56] studies third-
party analytics and ad libraries, and find that 60% of the
paid apps contain at least one tracker that collects personal
information. A similar study [32] examines how users are
tracked by running android apps; they find that 57% of the
apps and every participant in their study is tracked several
times for sensitive information. The authors in [57] collects
network traffic using ‘ ICSI Haystack’ app and distinguishes
between ad and analytics libraries and for collecting various
information. Furthermore, the authors in [58], [59] study the
distribution of third-party trackers across web and android
apps and their impact on user privacy.
Analysis of third-party tracking scripts: Third-party
web tracking, the practice using which websites identify and
collect information about users, has been widely studied
in literature, e.g. [60] develops a client side and identify
500 unique trackers and finds that majority of commercial
websites are tracked by multiple parties. The authors in
[61] develop a tool TrackingExcavator’ for longitudinal mea-
surements of third-party web tracking 1996-2016 and finds
that tracking mechanism is constantly becoming complex
and widely used. An open-source27 privacy measurement
tool ‘OpenWPM’ automatically detects and characterizes
emerging online tracking behaviors. The ‘TrackingFree’ [62]
provides an anti-tracking browser solution that automat-
ically breaks the tracking chain for third-party tracking
web tracking by disabling unique identifies. Similarly, [48]
analyze the protection level offered across a wide range of
web and mobile apps and evaluates their effectiveness for
blocking third-party tracking. They find that more than 60%
of third-party tracking services communicate in plain text.
Privacy-preserving mobile advertising: There are a
number of privacy-preserving personalization and architec-
27. https://github.com/mozilla/OpenWPM
tures both for in-browser and in-app that propose private
profiling and advertising systems, such as, Adnostic [20],
Privad [19], RePriv [63], MobiAd [64], Splitx [65]. Adnos-
tic, Privad and RePriv are browser-based extensions that
focus on targeting users based on their browsing activities
and locally carry out profiling (i.e. in the user’s browser).
MobiAd suggest local user profiling and receives ads in
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) fashion via broadcasting
stations and WiFi hotspots. Similarly, SplixX uses differen-
tially private queries over distributed user data. Further-
more, another noisy technique ‘Bloom cookies’ [66] presents
a framework for privacy preserving personalization of web
searches of locally derived profile. In our previous works,
we propose ‘ProfileGuard’ [5], [15] that is an app-based
profile obfuscation mechanism and a privacy-preserving
mobile advertising system based on various implementation
of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [2].
The authors in [21] present a targeted mobile coupon
delivery scheme based on Blockchain, however this frame-
work does not include all components of the advertising
system including user profile construction, detailed struc-
ture of various transactions and operations, or other entities
from our work, such as the Miner and the billing process.
In addition, it does not specify the technical details of access
policy to control access to resources, e.g., ads. Another work
[67] implements a protocol for personal data management
using Blockchain that ensures user’s ownership and control
over data. We present a decentralized Blockchain-based
advertising system that ensures private user profiling, in
addition, the transfer of information between user and CS
and between CS and APS uses an encryption algorithm to
ensure data security. Furthermore, the control of informa-
tion and user’s ownership and control over its profiling
data is ensured using access policy. We also propose private
billing mechanism for ad presentations and clicks based on
Cryptocurrency. For scalability of the system, we introduce
the cluster head that can process ad-block requests for Miner
for storing user profiles and fetching ads from CS.
8 CONCLUSION
The in-app mobile advertising is growing in popularity,
while the advertising companies use excellent user-tracking
tools, which have raised concerns among privacy advo-
cates. This paper presents the design of a Blockchain-based
framework for advertising platform in addition to imple-
mentation of its various critical components that allows the
cloud system to privately compute access policies both for
mobile users and ad systems for accessing various resources,
private user profiling, private billing, privately requesting
ads from the advertising system based on user interests,
and devising various transactions for enabling advertising
operations in Blockchain. We develop POC implementation
of our proposed framework and perform a thorough system
evaluation and stress test its various components in order
to evaluate different constraints of processing delays. Our
evaluations show an acceptable amount of processing delay
for performing various operations of accessing relevant ads
as that of the currently implemented ad system in an actual
environment.
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